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Vico & the New Science of Interpretation
Beyond Philosophical Hermeneutics & the
Hermeneutics of Suspicion

David Ingram

T

he tendency among contemporary intellectual historians to
project the prejudices of their own society onto their subjects is
not always a reflection of unconscious conceit. A case in point is
the problem one encounters when trying to fathom what Jules Michelet
once famously referred to as the “petit pandemonium” of Giambattista
Vico’s Scienza Nuova (Michelet 1843, 4-5). Finding meaningful coherence in the often confusing architectonic of this baroque masterpiece
has perforce compelled commentators to read into it the ideas of their
own age. As Vico himself observed, “whenever men can form no idea of
distant and unknown things, they judge them by what is familiar and
at hand” (Vico 1968, par. 122-23). This “axiom” of interpretation, he
believed, “points to the inexhaustible source of all the errors about the
principles of humanity” evinced by the enlightened natural law theorists
of his day, who sought to interpret the barbarian peoples of antiquity
as if they were civilized philosophers (122-23).
Yet if we accept the argument advanced by Hans-Georg Gadamer
(Gadamer 1993), the mediation of past and present that occurs whenever commentators judge the past from what is familiar at hand need
not obstruct understanding and in fact may be necessary for it. The
legitimate demand to understand an original thinker of Vico’s stature
exactly as his contemporaries understood him—or as he understood
himself—can at best be partially realized. For a literal replication of Vico’s
understanding—replete with all its parochial anachronisms—would
simply render him meaningless to contemporary readers. What Vico
means by scienza and coscienza, to take one obvious example, does not
 All references to Vico’s Scienza Nuova will be taken from the numbered
paragraphs of The New Science of Giambattista Vico (Vico 1968).
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exactly correspond to the English expressions“science” and“knowledge.”
The Italian words with their Latin roots imply a kind of familiarity
that seems far removed from our more modern concept of a technical
expertise. And then there is Vico’s own peculiar usage of these words,
which recall Scholastic and Cartesian philosophical antecedents.
Given the futility of trying to understand him exactly as his contemporaries understood him, it is hardly surprising that contemporary
commentators have interpreted Vico in light of the pressing issues
confronting today’s philosophers and historians. Thus, in what has
now become a standard tribute paid to Vico, Ernst Cassirer and, more
recently, Isaiah Berlin have argued that Vico’s single greatest accomplishment was to have seen (however dimly) what later philosophers
and historians writing over a century later would fully comprehend:
that historical knowledge possesses an interpretative logic that is radically different from the causal-explanatory logic definitive of natural
scientific knowledge.
Assuming that Cassirer and Berlin are right, it is imperative that
hermeneuticists who follow in the steps of Vico understand what kind
of interpretative logic he may have had in mind. Vico refers to a kind
of self-knowledge (reflessione) that is very different from the Cartesian
inspection of the mind, conceived as a method for knowing physical
nature (Vico 1968, par. 236). In his opinion, the only true knowledge
we can obtain while “reflecting within the modifications of our very own
mind” (dentro le modificazione della medisima nostra mente umana—par.
331) is knowledge of the modifications of human nature, conceived as
a relatively invariant process of historical evolution and devolution.
Why does he say this? What is special about reflecting on the past
that sets it apart from mathematical and conceptual reflection? Vico
provides us with many clues about what he means by ‘mind’ (mente),
‘reflection’ (reflessione), ‘common sense’ (sensus communis), ‘imagination
(fantasia), and other terms he uses that have a bearing on our query.
For his own part, Berlin thinks that the kind of ‘understanding’ (verstehen) we find in Vico is broadly equivalent to the kind of Empfindung
and Nacherleben (sympathetic and imaginative identification with and
 Ernst Cassirer, e.g., argued that“the real value in Vico’s‘philosophy of history’
… and what he did see clearly, and what he defended against Descartes, was
the methodological uniqueness and distinctive value of historical knowledge”
(Cassirer 1960, 52). Cf. also Berlin 1976.
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experiential reconstruction of ) cultural worldviews of the sort later
expounded by Wilhelm Dilthey and other historicists.
However promising this conjecture might be for answering our question, Gadamer’s criticism of Berlin’s type of historicism suggests that
Berlin might be mistaken. For if Gadamer is right, historicism tacitly
invokes precisely the kind of Cartesian reflection that Vico himself repudiates (Gadamer 1993, 187-91, 220-37). How then, can we reconcile
Berlin’s interpretation of Vico—with its implication that Vico was an
historicist avant la lettre and (accepting Gadamer’s view of historicism)
a “closet” Cartesian—with the near universal opinion that Vico’s notion
of historical understanding is un-Cartesian?
I argue that we cannot accept Berlin’s interpretation, and furthermore
that Vico must have had in mind a different notion of verstehen possessing a different logic of reflection. The most obvious candidate for
such an alternative notion of historical understanding is the dialectical (or rather, dialogical) one proposed by none other than Gadamer
himself. Indeed, it is Gadamer who draws our attention to aspects of
Vico’s account of verstehen that anticipate such a notion of historical
understanding. These aspects chiefly revolve around the importance of
common sense and rhetoric in providing (in the precise sense intended
by Martin Heidegger) an ontological; viz., pre-methodological, grounding for mutual understanding (Gadamer 1993, 19-24). In Gadamer’s
opinion, Vico’s awareness of this ontological grounding is manifested
in his belief that practical judgment (Aristotelian phronesis) is rooted
in a pre-rational common sense, or intuitive certainty of what is just and
good, that is conditioned by both acculturation in shared tradition and
the unique circumstances of the agent’s situation; and it is precisely this
mode of historical being that calls forth a dialogical interplay between
tradition and the agent’s situation.
Yet, despite anticipating a dialogical model of verstehen in his discussion of common sense and rhetoric, Vico did end up embracing a
more historicist interpretation one. As Gadamer notes, in explaining
 Although Berlin notes that Vico “does not account for our knowledge of
other selves—individual or collective, living or dead—by invoking the language
of empathy, or analogical reasoning, or intuition or participation in the unity of
the World Spirit” (Berlin 1976, 27), he elsewhere notes that Johann Gottfried
Herder’s description of the historical sense with “sympathetic insight – one’s
capacity for einfühlen (‘empathy’) … bears an uncanny resemblance to that of
Vico” (187).
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how historical understanding is possible, Vico conceives the relationship between agent and history along the model of technical making
(Aristotelian techne). In Gadamer’s opinion, this mistaken view about
the relationship between the agent and his historical “substance” commits Vico to a kind of subjective idealism; the historian is understood
as methodically re-creating a past she has already created, simply in
virtue of participating in one and the same universal history-creating
humanity. Thus, for Vico as for Dilthey, verstehen designates not an
ontological mode of human existing underlying all knowledge and
action whatsoever, but a distinct type of historical knowing that still
retains a vestigial link to rational, Cartesian methodology (Gadamer
1993, 230, 276, 373, 572).
Can we then not say that Vico is proposing an anti-Cartesian account of historical knowledge? Yes and no. Berlin’s view that Vico’s
account implies empathetic identification correctly identifies one aspect
of a complex ontological (dialectical) and methodological account of
verstehen, namely the importance of fantasy (imagination) in creating
analogies (“correspondences”) between what are otherwise dissimilar
worldviews and, more important, between human history and natural
process (Berlin 1976, 73). He is also right in noting that one such
analogy links the “modifications” of our own minds as we grow from
childhood to maturity to the “modifications” of the human spirit as it
grows from childlike barbarity to rational civility (45). Following Max
Fisch (Vico 1968, A4, xxiii), I would go even further in arguing that
Vico’s historical hermeneutics appeals to a structural analogy between
phylogenetic and ontogenetic development that anticipates the“hermeneutics of suspicion” advocated by Jürgen Habermas.
This evolutionary scheme is clearly beholden to rational insight and
generalizing method, and indeed supports the view that reason is the
crowning achievement of human evolution. At the same time, there are
ontological aspects of Vico’s critical hermeneutics that qualify his belief
 The view I am defending here—that Vico’s rejection of Cartesian (or analytic)
rationality does not entail a rejection of rational methodology as such—has
recently been defended by Leon Pompa. I differ from Pompa, however, in
arguing that, for Vico, the kind of rational methodology intrinsic to historical
knowledge is continuous with the non-analytic (or synthetic) logic of poetic
imagination, which is pre-rational in its origins. Cf. Pompa 1990.
 For a good discussion of the importance of rhetoric, judgment, imagination,
and analogical reasoning in Vico’s new science, see Schaeffer 1990.
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in the progressive nature of this development. Although Vico intends
to unmask the ideological misapprehension that worships the past
and extols the timeless authority of tradition—a conservative bias that
Habermas and other critical theorists ascribe to Gadamer’s philosophical
hermeneutics—he also intends to unmask the unreasonable pretensions
of any critical reason that aspires to replace traditional authority.
On one hand, he clearly believes that particular religions, institutions, and traditions are not timeless instantiations of eternal verities,
but are human fictions that reflect the historically conditioned biases
of particular types of human beings and of the particular political and
economic classes to which they belong. Only in the last stage of social
evolution, what Vico calls the Age of Men, can it be said that such religions, institutions, and traditions take on a rational form that favors
everyone’s universal interests equally and impartially. On the other
hand—anticipating Rousseau, Nietzsche, and Weber—Vico holds that
too much civilization produces moral decay. By demanding that every
belief be analyzable into clear and distinct ideas possessing demonstrable
certainty, hyperbolic reason undermines faith in traditional authority.
Subsequent skepticism regarding the intrinsic worth of moral values
encourages an instrumental rationalism oriented exclusively toward the
efficient pursuit of individual self-interest, the egoism of which dissolves
society into that “war of all against all” so famously depicted by Hobbes.
As noted above, Vico’s own construal of history as a Promethean act
of instrumental self-creation does not entirely escape this “dialectic of
enlightenment,” as Adorno and Horkheimer famously dubbed it. To the
extent that it does, however, Vichean hermeneutics endeavors to show
how even rational criticism must accept certain traditional authorities
unquestioningly, on faith.
Vico principally has in mind faith in divine providence (that everything
historical can be seen as fulfilling a higher meaning and purpose). Of
course, for modern-day secular thinkers like myself, one might plausibly
interpret Vico’s appeal to providence as an appeal to a logic of development
imminent within all incipient languages and cultures whose beneficent
effects become apparent to us from the vantage point of enlightened
hindsight. Yet, regardless of how we understand Vichean providence, it
is clear from Vico’s text that critical reason cannot be the highest or final
epistemic authority (as Descartes would have it) but must itself rest on
the timeless and eternal (and hence quasi-divine) authority of language
and tradition (as Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics would have it).
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For it is this background of potential meaningfulness that guides all
forms of understanding, historical or natural scientific.

1. Vico and Cartesianism
A convenient way to begin our examination of Vico’s new science of
historical understanding is by recalling his famous criticism of Descartes’
criterion of truth and its elevation of the causal-explanatory methodology of the physical sciences as the via regia to knowledge. In his Seventh
Inaugural Address (1708) entitled De Nostri Temporis Studiorum Ratione
(‘Of The Study Methods of Our Time’), Vico had argued that physical
science is not the demonstrable science that Descartes thought it was,
because if it were, then we – not God - would have made the laws of
physics. By contrast, geometry is demonstrable precisely because it is
we who have stipulated its definitions and axioms (Vico 1965, 23).
Vico’s astonishing claim owes much to the venerable medieval doctrine
that knowledge is “per caussas.” . For Augustine and Aquinas, God’s
knowledge is of this sort: because He created the world, He knows its
intrinsic purposes. Invoking the Renaissance analogy between God and
Man, Vico attributes a similar knowledge to human beings, but only with
regard to what they create. God—not man—is the creator of physical
nature. Human beings, therefore, can only demonstrate how – not why
- the laws of physics function the way they do. Experimental physics
thus yields at best probabilistic knowledge. It is entirely different with
geometry, since we have stipulated the conventions which define the
operations and meanings of mathematical entities.
Two years later (1710), in De Antequissima, Vico announced his
famous doctrine that “the true and the made are convertible” (verum et
factum convertuntur). However, he had not yet established—as Hobbes
in fact had already done—that demonstrable knowledge can be applied
to the real (human) world. Geometry did not apply to this world, in his
opinion, since it only articulated distinctions fabricated by the human
mind that are valid, stricto sensu, only in the inner world of ideas. Physics remained the most reliable “knowledge” of the real world, which in
his opinion was highly fallible, albeit not as fallible as history. Having
not attained the level of nomothetic explanation, history amounted to
little more than what (as he put it in his Third Inaugural Lecture of
1702) “a potter, a cook, a cobbler, a summoner, an auctioneer in Rome”
might provide a philologist studying Roman artifacts (Vico 1911, 35
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ff.). This dismissive attitude toward history as an arbitrary collection
of particular facts—so reminiscent of Descartes’ remark that historians
of Rome know little more than Cicero’s servant girl—would later be
abandoned by Vico in 1712. However, by now he had already jettisoned
the Cartesian criterion of truth, based on the perception of clear and
distinct ideas, as being too subjective and prone to error. More important,
he had begun to elevate common sense certainty (il certo) of the world
as directly lived and experienced by people in their everyday practical
lives to a level of knowledge beyond the mere subjective opinion to
which Descartes had apparently consigned it.
Elaborating the radical change in Vico’s thinking announced in the
Diritto Universale (1720), the first edition of Vico’s Scienza Nuova
(1725) recombines these ideas in startling fashion. Historical science is
now elevated above deductive knowledge of the mathematical type and
inductive knowledge of the natural scientific type. In essence, historical
knowledge combines the virtues of these separate modes of knowledge
without their attendant defects. Like mathematical knowledge, historical knowledge is about something human beings have made – the
languages, institutions, and actions that make up social reality – and
hence can be known per caussas and with a degree of certainty aspiring
to demonstrable truth. Like natural scientific knowledge, it is about a
factual reality that transcends subjective experience and mere conceptual
analysis. To cite Vico:
As geometry, when it constructs the world of quantity out of its
elements, or contemplates that world, is creating it for itself, just so
does our Science [create for itself the world of nations], but with a
reality greater by so much as the institutions having to do with human affairs are more real than points, lines surfaces, and figures are
(Vico 1968, par. 349).

In short, because we ourselves have injected our own purposes into the
stuff of history, and because even what we have unintentionally created
in history—languages, customs, traditions, etc.—is meaningful to us
from within our own mental and spiritual life—we can understand
history as something intrinsically intelligible in a way that we cannot
understand physical nature. To paraphrase Berlin, I may have some
knowledge of how trees and ants look and behave based upon external
observation, but I cannot know what it means to be them in the same
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way I know—from the inside, as it were—what it means to be a human
being (Berlin 1976, 23).

2. The Possibility of Historical Understanding:
Combining Philosophical Reason and
Aesthetic Imagination in the New Science
What is this new kind of historical self-knowledge that Vico is supposedly proposing? Berlin thinks he has an answer. Referring Vichean
reflissione (self-knowledge) to the operations of fantasia (imagination),
he submits that the kind of “imaginative reconstruction” characteristic
of Vico’s conception of historical understanding amounts to a kind of
mental transposition into and identification with the otherwise alien
worldviews of past epochs. In short, like later historicists in the German
Romantic school, Vico is said to believe that present and past epochs are
radically incommensurable, incomparable, and even untranslatable—so
much so that Vico would vehemently deny Leonardo Bruni’s claim, so
typical of Renaissance humanism, that “Nothing is said in Greek that
cannot be said in Latin” (Berlin 1976, 139).
Why attribute to Vico such an extreme—and implausible—view
of incommensurability? The view is patently self-defeating, since one
would have had to translate Greek and Latin into one’s own language
in order to know that they were incommensurable (untranslatable),
thereby rendering them commensurable (Davidson 1984). Berlin
himself offers scant evidence to show that Vico actually believed that
cultural worldviews were this incommensurable. Vico’s adamant refusal
to accept the notion of a timeless human nature replete with a timeless
natural law to govern it is not evidence that he held this radical view.
For the New Science is very much written from the standpoint of a jurist
who did believe in a natural law common to all peoples—albeit a law
of historical evolution. To understand the present as an outgrowth of
the past amounts to understanding the past as an anticipation of the
present. This way of translating the mente of the past into the mente
of the present preserves rather than obliterates the difference between
past and present. The natural law theorists of Vico’s day, however, did
not translate the past into the present: rather, they simply projected the
present onto the past. To cite Vico:
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The three princes of this doctrine [of natural law—D.I.], Hugo
Grotius, John Selden, and Samuel Pufendorf, should have taken their
start from the beginnings of the gentes, where their subject matter
begins. But all three of them err together in this respect, by beginning
in the middle; that is, with the latest times of the civilized nations
(and thus with men enlightened by fully natural reason), from which
the philosophers emerged and rose to meditation of a perfect idea of
justice (Vico 1968, par. 394).

In contrast to the static notion of human nature appealed to by the
natural law doctrines of his time, Vico’s “natural law of gentes” rests
upon a dynamic conception of human nature and of human nations
(gentes). Both terms—natura and genti (the Italian plural of gente,
whose Latin roots are gens and the plural nominative gentes)—refer
to birth (natio/(nascimento) and genesis, or growth and development
(Vico 1968, par. 147).
By ‘nation’ Vico means a distinctive group of people who descend from
common institutional origins peculiar to themselves, viz., institutions
that are not shared by others and which develop according to an internal
logic impelled mainly by internal class struggles. Vico himself restricts
his study to the “gentile” nations for whom, unlike the Jews, the truth of
God’s providence was not revealed once and for all and who must therefore historically evolve toward this ideal state without ever completely
attaining it (Vico 1968, par. 167, 365). The descendants of Ham and
Japheth and the non-Hebraic descendants of Shem are described by
Vico as having lost all language and civil institution and being reduced
to utter bestiality (par. 369). The rebirth of these giant bestioni and ferini
into a nation—or rather, “un mondo delle nazioni”—begins with their
providential discovery of matrimonial and religious institutions. From
that point on, each nation runs though three successive ages, or stages
of natural genesis: that of Gods, that of heroes, and that of men. Only
in the last age do human beings approximately achieve (for however
fleeting a moment) the “rational humanity” that is “the true and proper
nature of man” (par. 973), namely of “human reason fully developed” and
reconciled to faith (par. 326, 924). Because this end is an ideal that is
never completely achieved, the natural (although perhaps not inevitable)
fate of most nations is dissolution and return to state of barbarism,
whence the cycle of ages begins anew, albeit at a higher level.
 Vico believes that, following the flourishing of enlightenment during
late antiquity and continuing through the fall of the Roman Empire, a new
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Vico’s pointed reference to a“natural law of gentes” common to all gentile peoples thus refers primarily to the fact that all peoples run through
one and the same universal course of historical evolution and that all
peoples, regardless of their peculiar differences, preserve and maintain
themselves through institutions of marriage, burial, and religion (Vico
1968, par. 332-33). The important point to note in this adumbration
is that, according to Vico, these universals of human society did not
emerge through cultural diffusion or communication between different
peoples, since the latter are“separately founded because remote from each
other in time and space” (par. 332-33). Therefore,“the common ground
of truth” underlying “uniform ideas originating among entire peoples
unknown to each other” (par. 144) must be divine providence.
I will have more to say below about the importance of providence in
Vico’s new science. Presently it suffices to note the severity of the problem
Vico has set for himself. Different nations may share a common natural
law of development, but such a common ground of understanding will
not aid in understanding earlier stages of human understanding that
are so radically different from our enlightened nature. As Vico himself
puts it:
To discover the way in which this first human thinking arose in the
gentile world, we encountered exasperating difficulties which have
cost us the research of a good twenty years. [We had] to descend
from these human and refined natures of ours to those quite wild and
savage natures, which we cannot at all imagine and can comprehend
with only great effort (par. 338).

In the passage cited above, Vico affirms that pre-civilized ways of understanding can be understood—the new science is proof of this—albeit
with great difficulty. This affirmation alone suffices to rebut the incommensurability thesis attributed to him by Berlin. Still, the problem
remains how radically different ways of understanding can be made
commensurable from the vantage point of the historian. The key to
bridging this gap—and the key to understanding what kind of historical
understanding Vico may have had in mind—resides in his belief that
Christian era inaugurates the cycle of ages once more. Unlike its Egyptian and
Greco-Roman precursors, this ricorso of historical development begins with a
barbarism (the Dark Ages) that inherits a superior poetic wisdom, in that the
God it worships is more human and morally superior than the pagan Gods
of antiquity.
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all modern languages (viz., rationalized prose languages whose clear
and distinct conceptual distinctions between words facilitate useful
communication) contain residues of their poetic past: “We find that the
principles of these origins both of languages and of letters lie in the fact
that the early gentile peoples, by a demonstrated necessity of nature,
were poets who spoke in poetic characters” (par. 34).
The poetic wisdom of the divine and heroic ages of humanity consisted of creating the symbols (at first hieroglyphics) and metaphors
out of which human institutions and social relationships are created. In
Vico’s opinion, these symbols and images worked through a logic that
bore some resemblance to what Aristotle called the ars topica, the art
of hitting upon common places (topoi), or analogies for fashioning the
most rhetorically convincing (i.e., probable) explanation for some fact.
Rather than using cause and effect to explain things, primitive human
beings used resemblance. Things that belonged together by resemblance
also had magical affinities with respect to their properties that could be
used to explain their behavior.
For Vico, primitive humans rely upon a kind of “corporeal imagination” to invent“sensory topics,” or“imaginative universals.” Such humans
naturally take what is most familiar to themselves—their own bodies
and its feelings—as a reference point for inventing fables about nature,
whose properties seem to resemble the properties of human action. To
illustrate such anthropomorphizing: Vico notes how startling sounds
such as thunder would be construed “in the first place” as a human-like
grumble or shout—the voice of the sky but also of God, or Jove (Vico
1968, par. 377). The fright and subsequent flight to cave shelters—the
origination of all settled, civilized life, according to Vico—was the first
instinctual reflex of a mortal fear of God. Thus was born religion. By
further analogical reasoning these early cave dwellers later interpreted
the fact of settled life as something divinely sanctioned. Here begins
the genesis of an heroic ethos that would explicitly link settled property
with noble, divine-like authority and power. Presuming themselves to
be descended from the Gods and the first race of mortal heroes, these
nobles imagined themselves to be—their mortality in this world notwithstanding—as divine-like and immortal as the eternal and unchanging natural deities governing them. Hence they would naturally seek to
guarantee their eternal patrimony through marriage laws establishing
patrilineal descent. Likewise, they would establish burial laws and rites
as further proof of their immortality.
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Thus, Vico concludes that it is through a poetic logic of metaphorical
association—not through an analytic logic of abstract reasoning—that
the three fundamental institutions of religion, marriage, and burial that
ground the possibility of law, morality, and society are instituted. As
he notes, heroic emblems attest to this primitive amalgamation by analogically condensing religion, property, and legal authority into a single
symbol or metaphor. The heraldic device of an oak tree, for instance,
refers to noble descent (symbolized by fixed roots), settled property
(symbolized by the shelter of a forest canopy), religion (symbolized
by the binding together, or religio, of branches around a single trunk),
and law (symbolized by an acorn, whose archaic Latin root is related
to both God and law, or ius).
To return to our original query, the problem of historical understanding
amounts to bridging the gap separating the modern historian’s rational
understanding, which is informed by the clear conceptual distinctions
operant within ordinary speech, from the primitive agent’s poetic understanding, which is informed by the collapsing of such distinctions
necessary for creating original classifications and linkages based on
superficial resemblances. In the New Science, philology provides one
condition for bridging this gap, philosophy the other.
Philosophy contemplates reason, whence comes knowledge of the
true; philology observes that of which human choice is the author,
whence comes consciousness of the certain. This axiom by its second
part includes among the philologians all the grammarians, historians,
critics, who have occupied themselves with the study of the languages
and the deeds of peoples: deeds at home, as in their customs and laws,
and deeds abroad, as in their wars, peaces, alliances, travels, commerce. This same axiom shows how the philosophers failed by half
in not giving certainty to their reasonings by appeal to the authority
of the philologians, and likewise how the latter failed by half by not
taking care to give their authority the sanction of truth by appeal to
the reasonings of the philosophers (Vico 1968, par. 138-40).

According to Vico, philology is a branch of coscienza, conscious experience and understanding of particular facts, including facts about
particular historical human beings and their particular societies. Coscienza is capable of achieving certainty (il certo), either by the direct and
unquestioned sensory experience of physical nature or by the direct and
unquestioned understanding of language and other institutions. This
is what Vico means by common sense (sensus communis) or “judgment
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without reflection.” Here is where Vico draws his important distinction
between two types of common sense: inner and outer. Again, although
we can be said to have direct and indubitable sensory experience of
physical nature—however rationally fallible it might be—it is, for Vico,
of a different kind than the direct and indubitable understanding we
have of the language and institutions that constitute our lives “from the
inside.” Indeed, if our common sense understanding of language and
life can never aspire to the kind of rationally demonstrable certainty
and universal truth that Vico associates with that other human science—geometry—it is nonetheless capable of achieving a certainty and
demonstrability greater than that of physics.
Although Vico speaks of common sense as providing the kind of
pre-reflective certitude philologists can claim for their findings, he
elsewhere (as noted above) asserts that common sense qua common
designates a kind of universal understanding that lies at the origin of all
languages, no matter how different they are from one another. In this
respect, philology can aid philosophy in its search for universal truths
and, more important, can aid historical understanding by revealing a
“common language” bridging what are otherwise radically distinct nations and epics.
There must in the nature of human institutions be a mental language
common to all nations, which uniformly grasps the substance of things
feasible in human social life, and expresses it with as many diverse
modifications as these same things have diverse aspects. A proof of
this is afforded by proverbs or maxims of vulgar wisdom, in which
substantially the same meanings find as many diverse expressions as
there are nations ancient and modern. This common mental language
is proper to our Science, by whose light linguistic scholars will be
enabled to construct a mental vocabulary common to all the various
articulate languages living and dead (par.161).

Clearly, philology is able to construct a common language bridging
modern (conceptual) and ancient (poetic) languages because the former
contains traces of the latter in its own etymology. Today’s dead metaphors were yesterday’s living metaphors and as such reveal something
about the lives and institutions of earlier humans (par. 152). Indeed,
according to Vico, today’s clear and distinct ideas merely condense
yesterday’s metaphors:
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Take for example, “the blood boils in my heart,” based on a property
natural, eternal, and common to all mankind. They took the blood,
the boiling, and the heart, and then made of them a single word, as
it were, a genus, called in Greek stomachos, in Latin ira, and in Italian
collera (par. 460).

Although philology goes far toward bridging the gap between present
and past, it cannot succeed alone in this endeavor. Philosophy is needed
to provide direct and rational insight into the universal laws governing
the evolution from past to present implicit in the corsi run by all nations.
How it accomplishes this is far from clear. Vico mentions that philosophers sometimes cognize universals by means of abstracting common
properties from a comparison of particulars. Thus, he notes that before
the Athenians enacted their laws they came to agreement independently
about their utility, which agreement was then adumbrated by Socrates
“by induction” in the form of “collecting uniform particulars which go
to make up” “intelligible genera or abstract universals” (Vico 1968, par.,
1040). In his introductory commentary to the third edition of the New
Science, Max Fisch also seems to imply that this is how philosophical
reason supplements philology (Fisch, 1744, xxx). However, as Berlin
rightly notes, that couldn’t be the whole story, since induction based on
observed similarities yields at best probabilistic“knowledge” of how things
happen and not the demonstrable understanding of why things must
happen that Vico claims for his historical science (Berlin 1976, 83).
Vico must therefore be understood as saying that philosophical reason
takes up the “certain” findings of philological understanding and the
less certain probabilistic findings of comparative history in rationally
intuiting the universal stages of historical development. Just how this
is possible—if God and not humanity is the creator of these natural
laws—is unclear. As Habermas notes, Vico denies that historical agents
make history with the same degree of transparent consciousness that
God (for whom conceiving is creating) makes nature, here understood
to include human nature and its historical laws. Like Hegel’s cunning
of reason (List der Vernunft), Vico’s God makes historical agents accomplish higher ends without their conscious consent and participation.
Furthermore, Vico’s cyclical understanding of historical laws conforms
more closely to the pagan view of “naturalized” history than to the
Christian (or salvationist) view traditionally associated with the idea of
providence. Since history does not progress in any straightforward linear
manner, it is difficult for Vico to sustain that history as such reveals a
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clear and certain, rational pattern (or logic) of providential lawfulness
(Habermas 1973, 244-247).
The last problem may indeed be insuperable. However, if we leave aside
the problem of cyclical ricorsi and focus exclusively on the laws governing
historical corsi, which do reveal a progressive development, a solution
to the first problem may be at hand. Anticipating the absolute idealism
of Hegel, Vico may have believed that human beings could participate
directly in the divine mind. This idea seems less far-fetched when we
recall that, for Vico, humans create religion—and God—in their own
image (Vico 1968, par. 367). Like Hegel, Vico might then be understood
as equating God with the human spirit, so that the providential corsi
run by all nations would be a human creation fully knowable by them.
Knowing themselves as historical beings would then be tantamount to
knowing the self-actualization of God in history.
Such an intriguing solution to the problem of universal historical
knowledge transcends the scope of our epistemological inquiry, which
is focused on the possibility of a more mundane solution. One solution, alluded to earlier, appeals to the fact that analytical reason builds
upon and incorporates the accomplishments of poetic wisdom. Just as
Immanuel Kant would later argue that analytic reason (abstraction and
induction) already presupposes synthetic (transcendental) reason, which
deploys the schematism of the imagination to unify discrete sensory
qualia into image-types (or schemas), so Vico argues that abstracting
universal laws presupposes analogical reasoning, which creates imaginative universals. Following yet another clue suggested by Kant, such
analogical reasoning can be compared to a kind of reflective judgment,
which discovers universals (or types, such as“the beautiful”) based upon
feelings and intuitions associated with particulars.
Drawing from an example that is closer to Vico’s own experience
as a jurist, judges defer to reflective judgment whenever they seek to
discover the proper rule under which to subsume cases that are susceptible to conflicting interpretations. Cases that are especially recalcitrant
to subsumption under given laws may call forth an additional act of
reflective judgment in which the laws themselves are reinterpreted. A
case in point is the right to privacy in American jurisprudence. This
 Kant’s examination of the amphibolies of reflection in the First Critique
and his account of reflective judgment in the Third Critique further extend his
treatment of synthetic reason. For discussion of this aspect of Kant’s thought
see Ingram 1985 and 1988.
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right was created (or “discovered”) in the landmark case Griswold v.
Connecticut (1965) by a process of analogical reasoning, in which the
freedom of couples to engage in family planning (including gaining
access to birth control) was compared to earlier constitutional rulings
regarding freedom from invasive search and seizure, freedom of speech,
and other “similar” cases.
The important point to bear in mind is that the analogical reasoning
deployed by jurists implicates a kind of non-analytical reflection. When
Vico says that historical knowledge presupposes philosophical reason, it
might very well be this kind of aesthetic and inventive reflection he has in
mind. Indeed, in the next section we shall see that it must be this kind
of reflection. But in that case, at least one form of enlightened reason
does possess an elective affinity with pre-enlightened poetic wisdom.
Such an affinity would bridge the gap between enlightened philosophical
understanding and poetic wisdom. And it would also confirm one of the
central tenets of philosophical hermeneutics as Gadamer understands
it. For Gadamer, Vico’s major contribution resides less in espousing a
method of historical understanding than in preserving an ontological
truth about human being in general: that the basis of practical reason
(what Aristotle calls phronesis) is none other than the art of sound judgment cultivated on the basis of common sense (Gadamer 1993, 19-24).
In other words, to the extent that any act of understanding involves the
judicious art of asking just the right questions (i.e., of applying what
one already knows to discover what one does not already know), any
knowledge whatsoever can be said to rest upon the re-appropriation
of an effective history, sedimented in tradition and language. Sound
judgment of this kind cannot be exercised through methodical analysis,
but must be acquired through experience.
But that cannot be all there is to historical understanding. Vico insists
that such historical understanding also presupposes a method – or
more precisely, knowledge of a sequential, law-like progression – that
enables the historian to understand earlier forms of society as in some
sense analogous to his or her own childhood. So construed, the new
science deploys a pre-methodological form of analogical reasoning to
discover a methodical form of explanation and understanding. For Vico
this methodical form of understanding presupposes that social evolution (phylogenesis) replicates the stages of maturation from childhood
(ontogenesis). Perhaps Vico believed that our lived participation in the
natural cycle of birth, maturation, and death provided an analogue to
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understanding the necessity of a similar cycle in the birth, maturation
and decline of nations (Vico 1968, par. 349). He himself draws the
analogy between childhood and poetic wisdom, on one hand, and maturity and philosophical wisdom, on the other, as partial confirmation
of his thesis (par. 186, 213, 408, 412-13, 447, 454, 498, 1032). The
language, logic, and thought-processes of the earliest peoples—the
“children of the human race” (par. 498)—replicate the language, logic,
and thought-processes of childhood. Because we modern rationalists
also passed through this stage, we can be said to have run through the
corso that all nations run through in our own lifetime, and so can be said
to be co-author of it to a degree that provides a modicum of historical
knowledge per caussas.
Establishing an analogy between phylogenesis and ontogenesis might
indeed be necessary for a speculative philosopher seeking to articulate
a universal history of humanity. Whether such an analogy can be sustained is, of course, a matter of considerable contention on which Vico
himself sheds very little light. Be that as it may, for our purposes the
question about social evolution revolves around the problem of historical understanding simpliciter and not merely around the problem of
establishing a universal course through which all nations traverse.

3. The Contemporary Relevance of Vico’s
Science of Historical Understanding
Before we examine the hypothesis that Vico’s historical hermeneutics
rests upon a theory of social evolution, let us re-examine more closely
why it cannot rest upon the historicist methodology attributed to it by
Berlin. It is true that Vico sometimes sounds like an historicist when
he talks about the radical gulf separating poetic from rational modes of
understanding. The impression he gives that worldviews and modes of
understanding are self-contained is further reinforced by his belief that
the gentile nations developed their own peculiar common sense without
communicating with one another (Vico 1968, par. 145).
Historicism is Cartesian in its view that the subject and object of
knowledge are separated by such an immense gulf that knowledge
can only be achieved by the knower “methodically” bracketing out
her subjectivity in an effort to conform to the object. More precisely,
historicists endeavor to bring about a true correspondence with their
object by critically checking the effects of their own worldview, as these
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are shaped by language and culture. In their opinion, once the historian
has cleared her head of all contemporary prejudices, she will be in a
position to sympathetically enter into the mind of her subject. If this
seems impossible, she can by-pass the deep, substantive differences she
finds incomprehensible in her subject and, like a natural scientist using
the inductive method, focus on the superficial formal resemblances
between it and her own worldview.
In that case, historical science would be imitating natural science.
This model of historical science, famously defended in the last century
by Karl Popper and Carl Hempel, is deeply problematic for reasons we
have already adduced. The universal laws that a naturalized historical
science discovers through a comparative analysis of particular historical
events will be useless in understanding why particular events had to
happen the way they did. Explanations of particular historical events by
appeal to general laws will never succeed because it is precisely the particular circumstances surrounding them—and above all, the particular
purposes of the agents who made them—that enable us to understand
why they had to happen the way they did. Stated differently, subsuming a particular event under a general covering law provides something
less than a genuine causal explanation of the event, and really amounts
to showing nothing more than how it resembles other events. In his
own way, Vico seems to have already anticipated this objection to the
covering-law method of historical explanation in his insistence that a
true historical cause must refer to a meaningful purpose of an agent,
be it human or superhuman.
In sum, although Vico often appeals to the comparative method in
defending the universal patterns common to all nations at a certain
stage of development (Vico 1968, par. 344-45), he cannot consistently
hold that this “abstract” knowledge is the true knowledge afforded by
his new science. Doing so would contradict his epistemological axiom
that true knowledge explains why things happen per caussas, which is
possible only because the knower has in some sense meaningfully and
intentionally participated in the creation of what she knows. The use
of observable associations between discrete types of events manifesting
a certain stochastic frequency, as David Hume rightly noted, cannot
explain, with the kind of “demonstrable necessity” Vico demands of
his science, why one nation passes from one stage of social evolution to
another. Such historical necessity, Vico says, must rather be understood
in the first place as internally caused by the freely willed intentions of
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human beings and, in the second place, by the unintended consequences
of such intentional acts. Such consequences must in turn be understood
as serving higher ends vis-à-vis the meaningful realization of institutions that are in turn logically necessary for the meaningful realization
of a fully human—and rational—way of life. In the last instance, this
amounts to showing how one stage of understanding logically implies
and irreversibly builds upon its predecessor—a kind of teleology that
Vico attributes to “divine providence.”
If the model of understanding appealed to by Vico is not the methodical suspension of subjective biases and imaginative identification
described by historicists, then what is it? As we have seen, Vico’s treatment of the connection between common sense, rhetoric, and judgment
suggests that the kind of historical understanding he has in mind is
closer to the pre-methodological, ontological understanding articulated
by Heideggerians like Gadamer. According to Gadamer, we can never
methodically rise above the parochial languages and traditions that have
shaped our understanding because, as Vico well understood, they form
the certain (if conceptually pre-reflective) common sense background to
all understanding. However, saying that understanding is conditioned
by the present does not prevent us from understanding the archaic past
(or for that matter, other cultures). For the present and past are held
together by a common and continuous culture whose changes in the
course of historical reinterpretation work to preserve its authority; and
even widely diverse cultures share a potential for mutual understanding
(what Gadamer calls the speculative dimension of language) based on
something analogous to Vico’s pre-reflective common sense (Vico 1968,
par. 356).
Vico warns us that historians must be careful not to “project” uncritically their “modern” and “enlightened” assumptions onto their archaic
subjects. But self-critical understanding need not—and as we have seen,
cannot—involve the wholesale bracketing of cultural and linguistic
prejudices. Rather, since we must engage our parochial prejudices in
understanding—they are, after all, the only familiar reference points
we have for interrogating the world around us—we must engage them
with the subject matter of the archaic text itself, in the form of simulated
dialogue involving mutual questioning. Here understanding will be
oriented toward a kind of agreement or mutual understanding, in which
the original meaning of the archaic text is nonetheless reinterpreted—or
rephrased—within the familiar language of the historian. So construed,

218

david ingram

historical interpretation will not be merely reproductive—preserving
the truth of tradition in some timeless and unchanging form—but will
also be poetic and creative.
As noted above, there are many indications within Vico’s text that
suggest that he shares the basic tenets of this philosophical hermeneutics.
To begin with, he embraces the fact that poetic language creates and
constitutes all meaning and identity, and so provides the Ursprung from
which reason itself springs (Vico 1968, par. 362). Too, he thinks we can
communicate with the past from the standpoint of the present—and
learn from it. This communication is implicitly dialogical, since Vico
believes that enlightened historical understanding can learn to appreciate the basic truth embedded in cultural tradition, namely that reason
itself rests upon a providential authority that transcends its powers of
analysis and clarification.
However, it would seem that Vico’s new science goes beyond philosophical hermeneutics in several important respects. First, it does not
vest particular traditional beliefs with a timeless claim to authority and
wisdom. On the contrary, it unmasks their ideological pretensions by
showing that they originate in ignorance (Vico 1968, par. 375) and
class domination. Such ideological justifications of domination may be
necessary in early stages of human evolution, but they are deceptions
nonetheless—falsehoods concealing the rational truth implicit in Christian humanism (par. 375). Second, the new science is able to do this
partly because it appeals to a view of historical evolution that sees the
rational age of men—the Cartesian age of clear and distinct ideas—as
a secular instantiation of Christian humanism, which articulates the
universal equality and freedom of all (reasonable) men as having been
made in the image of God. Finally, because the new science is itself a
product of this age, it must incorporate within its mode of historical
understanding the critical methods of philosophical science that enable
it to expose the deceptions of earlier ages.

4. Between Critical and Redemptive Hermeneutics:
Vichean Science as Humanistic Praxis and
Theological Consolation
What critical methods did Vico have in mind? They could not be the
methods of conceptual analysis proposed by Descartes, since these
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require abstracting from historical understanding. Nonetheless, there
is something vaguely Cartesian about Vico’s description of historical
methods. These methods involve rendering “clear and distinct” (par.
390) certain “modifications of the mind” (par. 349) that are objectified
in the historical traces of our own language. Vichean science begins by
analyzing the rich data of history (through “a severe analysis of human
thoughts”[par. 347]), in order to uncover certain universal and unquestioned principles—principles, to be sure, whose certainty is guaranteed
not by pure reason demanding indubitable certainty but rather by a kind
of pre-reflective common sense establishing what is beyond question.
With a kind of geometrical rigor, it deduces from these principles—of
religion, marriage, and burial—something like a necessary and universal
sequence of developmental stages, or what he elsewhere calls a “history
of ideas” (par. 347). This history, in turn, enables the new science to
prove the rational superiority of Christian humanism in comparison
to pre-rational religion (early Christianity included), which justifies
hierarchy and inequality.
Vico’s “hermeneutics of suspicion”—the unmasking of ideology as
subterfuge for class domination—proceeds by linking the understanding of meanings to the explanation of causes. The historical agent’s
purposes that lend action meaning produce both intended and unintended effects, and so are causes in this sense. However, such purposes
have concealed within them ulterior meanings and aims that are not
intended—indeed, are not even known—by the agent. The religious
myths that validate the heroic natural law that “might makes right” are
really an expression of a particular human caste system and not a true
depiction of divinity. But this deeper meaning is concealed from both
the powerful who invoke the law to advance their ends as well as from
the weak who submit to it in violation of their ends. Likewise, the fact
that such a caste system and its corresponding ideological form represent a necessary stage in human evolution is also concealed from them.
These two sets of deeper meanings—the genesis of natural law out of
contingent systems of human domination and the genesis of a stage of
social evolution according to a necessary logic—act to compel human
action in some causally necessary way.
Scholars such as Paul Ricoeur and Jürgen Habermas have convincingly
argued that the kind of hermeneutics of suspicion that I have attributed
to Vico’s new science can be compared to psychoanalytic interpretation.
 See Ricoeur 1970 and Habermas 1971.
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Like Freudian psychoanalysis, Vichean science approaches its subject
matter with suspicion: the literal or surface meaning of a neurotic episode
or social ideology is misunderstood or not understood at all by the agent,
so that what she thinks she is doing does not correspond to what she is
really doing. Her behavior therefore bears the trace of an unconscious
motivation that “compels” her to behave in mysterious ways.
It bears repeating that this is precisely the kind of concealed purpose
that, according to Vico, causally compels historical agents to bring
about—against their own free will—the higher purposes ordained by
Providence and the developmental logic implicit in the idea of humanity. In this sense, historical agents both are and are not the agents of
history. They become fully agents only after they understand the deeper
humanity animating their own behavior. The New Science aids in this
endeavor in two ways. First, it vindicates religion, moral moderation,
and faith in the immortality of the soul by showing that they are the
certain and unquestionable presuppositions underlying any form of
human life. Second, it shows how the achievement of rational humanism—indeed, the very science that criticizes unquestioned presuppositions—necessarily unfolds out of these very same taken-for-granted,
commonsense institutions.
But of course the new science is more than just “rational theology.” It is
rational theology used to unmask ideology. Just as psychoanalysis depends
upon a (mythic) theory of ontogenetic (psycho-sexual) development in
order to explain how the agent’s neurotic episodes can be understood
in terms of a failed attempt at resolving crises that necessarily unfold
within the hidden drama of sexual maturation, so too Vichean history
depends upon a theory of social evolution to explain how society’s
ideological compulsions can be understood in terms of failed attempts
at being fully human – or fully adult. Habermas (following Alfred
Lorenzer) has shown how such compulsions can be understood in
terms of a model of “distorted communication” (Habermas 1971, 256).
Neurotic behavior is a “symbolic” re-enactment of a childhood trauma
written in the paleo-symbolic code of the unconscious in which distinct
persons, things, and events from childhood are “poetically” condensed
or displaced through use of metonym, synecdoche, or metaphor. One
must have an understanding of this language—and the various manifestations it assumes in the course of psycho-sexual development—to
decipher the hidden meaning of the neurotic’s behavior, which is both
repetition of and fixation on an earlier infantile stage of development.
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Once this meaning is revealed to the neurotic, her behavior ceases to
be compelled by the logic of blind causality and can be rationally and
freely controlled.
A similar kind of distorted communication seems to explain ideologically rigidified behavior. The mechanical enactment of destructive
(masochistic and sadistic) behavior—for instance, the regression of
supposedly enlightened individuals into a fascist movement—can be
explained in terms of the hypnotic effect that pre-rational propaganda
has on the average mind. Fascist propaganda is similar to those “mute”
mytho-poetic (hieroglyphic) languages spoken by priests and children.
These languages, too, condense feeling and thought; play upon subliminal, unconscious associations between sexual desire and violence; and
deliberately conflate fantasy with fact, fact with norm, and norm with
personal charisma, in such a way as to resist rational questioning. As
Vico notes, such languages are more like divine incantations—or rituals—than meaningful utterances containing clear referential (factual)
meanings and interactive intentions.
Vico’s intriguing idea that each stage of social evolution possesses its
own distinctive level of linguistic, logical, and cognitive-moral development remarkably anticipates well-known theories of child development
advanced by Jean Piaget and, more recently, Habermas. According to
Habermas, the process of cultural and societal rationalization that accompanies social evolution can be understood as a process of “linguistification” whereby primitive, mythopoetic modes of language use are
gradually supplanted by more prosaic and utilitarian forms of rational
communication (Habermas 1984, 67-69, 72 ff.; 1984, 3-111). This has
important implications for Habermas’s approach to ideology critique.
Whereas early “poetic” modes of linguistic usage collapse distinctions
between facts, values, and personal expressions/fantasies—a syndrome
that still survives in early modern conceptions of natural, divine-command theories of natural law—modern “prosaic” communication
separates them out according to their own irreducibly distinct logics.
Because scientific-descriptive, legal-moral, and aesthetic-expressive
utterances are now treated as if they were logically distinct from one
another, they are uniquely susceptible to criticism by appeal to “clear
and distinct” standards of evidence (Habermas 1987, 188-97).
The centrality of clear and distinct standards of evidence to rational
critique returns us to our original theme: the manner in which Vichean
science both is and is not Cartesian. As we have seen, even the herme-
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neutics of suspicion must stop short of demanding absolute clarity and
indubitable certainty with respect to its subject matter. Ideology critique
can never aspire to complete transparent understanding of historical
meaning because even it must take for granted some unquestioned
presuppositions. Furthermore, when pure reason becomes uncritical of
its own hyperbolic pretensions—demanding absolute justification for
every conceivable authority—we descend into a kind of Jacobin Terror
in which all culture becomes suspect. Such “barbarism of reflection,”
as Vico refers to it, is irrational because it is contrary to what any selfcritical reason could reasonably demand.
In sum, critical reason becomes “redemptive” at the point in which
it becomes self-evident that meaning arises out of a pre-rational act of
poetic imagination. For theologically inspired critical theorists like
Vico and Walter Benjamin, language represents a sedimentation of
anonymous, meaning-creating syntheses that can never be replicated by
human beings acting rationally and deliberatively. The rhetorical power
of modern language owes an infinite debt to a poetic past whose roots
are essentially pre-rational. True understanding, therefore, will respect
and preserve that past, even as it criticizes it.
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